

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG

SUBJ: CSCE: POSITIONS OF ALLIES -- PART 12 - TURKEY

1. IN RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST, WE TRANSMIT BELOW OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE OF PARTICULAR CONCERNS WHICH TURKEY HAS IN CSCE. WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT ATTEMPTED TO ELABORATE ON SUBJECTS WHICH ARE OF GENERAL CONCERN TO ALL OR MOST NATO ALLIES, AND OF WHICH THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE.

2. TURKEY, CSCE, AND CYPRUS -- THE TURKS HAVE ALWAYS REGARDED THE CONFERENCE PRIMARILY AS A DAMAGE LIMITING OPERATION, AND HAVE NEVER HAD IMPORTANT POSITIVE OBJECTIVES IN IT. THE RECENT EVENTS IN CYPRUS HAVE STRONGLY REINFORCED THIS APPROACH, SINCE THEY HAVE PUT THE TURKISH DELEGATION IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST ACCUSATIONS OF VIOLATING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT ON WHICH THE CSCE IS BASED. THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CSCE, AND THEY CLING TO THEIR SPECIAL

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INTERESTS WITH TENACITY, BUT MORE THAN EVER THE TURKS

WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE AS PAINLESSLY
AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. ALLIED CONSULTATIONS -- THE TURKS HAVE FELT SOME-
WHAT LEFT OUT OF THE ALLIED CONSULTATION PROCESS IN
CSCE, BECAUSE FIRM EC-NINE POSITIONS ARE OFTEN AGREED
BEFORE PROBLEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN THE NATO CAUCUS. THE
CYPRUS PROBLEM HAS NOT HELPED THIS SITUATION. THE
TURKS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS
IN THE NATO CAUCUS, BUT THEY REALIZE THE DELICACY OF
THEIR POSITION, AND HAVE LET THE US, CANADIAN AND NOR-
WEGIAN DELEGATIONS TAKE THE LEAD IN STIMULATING SUCH
CONSULTATIONS.

4. CYPRUS ISSUE -- SINCE THE CYPRUS CRISIS BROKE AND
GREEK, CYPRIOT AND OTHER DELEGATIONS HAVE CRITICIZED
THE TURKISH ROLE, THE TURKS HAVE MADE IT KNOWN INFOR-
MALLY THAT IF SUCH CRITICISM GOES TOO FAR THEY WILL
QUESTION THE CREDENTIALS OF THE CYPRIOT DELEGATION,
AND WILL CLAIM THE DELEGATION DOES NOT REPRESENT THE
TURKISH POPULATION OF CYPRUS. SINCE THE CSCE WORKS
ENTIRELY ON A BASIS OF CONSENSUS, AND SUCH A QUESTION
HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN RAISED, IT WOULD POSE COMPLEX
PROBLEMS FOR THE CONFERENCE. IT THUS GIVES THE TURKS
A POTENT WEAPON IN THE CSCE CONTEXT.

5. PRINCIPLES -- WHILE THE TURKS GENERALLY AGREE
WITH ALLIED GOALS, THEIR APPROACH TO THIS SUBJECT AREA
IS STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THEIR DESIRE TO PROTECT
THEIR OWN INTERESTS, IN PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO CYPRUS.
MOST OF THE TEN CSCE PRINCIPLES COULD BE INVOKED AGAINST
TURKISH ACTIONS IN CYPRUS. THE TURKS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED
BY THE GREEKS AND CYPRIOTS OF VIOLATING MANY OF THE
PRINCIPLES, BUT THEIR RESPONSE THUS FAR HAS BEEN LOW
KEY. THEY HAVE INTRODUCED NO PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN,
BUT HAVE TAKEN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND HAVE TRIED TO
AVOID LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE DAMAGING TO THEIR
POSITIONS. THUS THEY SHOWED SOME NERVOUSNESS OVER A
SWISS PROPOSAL, SUPPORTED BY GREECE, WHICH INDICATED
THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
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OF OTHER COUNTRIES REGARDLESS OF THE STATE OF THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS. IN CONTEXT OF CURRENT DISCUSSIONS OF
SELF-DETERMINATION PRINCIPLE, GREEKS INTEND TO INTRO-
DUCE SOME LANGUAGE, BASED ON UN FRIENDLY RELATIONS
DECLARATION, WHICH WOULD HAVE PARTICIPANTS REFRAIN
FROM ENCOURAGING DISMEMBERMENT OF OTHER STATES.
DEPENDING UPON PRECISE PHRASEOLOGY USED, TURKS
MAY HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THIS PROPOSAL.

6. MILITARY ASPECTS --

(A) GENERAL -- TURKEY SHARES GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF NATO ALLIES TO HAVE SOME MODEST MILITARY CONTENT IN CSCE, PROVIDED THIS CONTRIBUTES TO, AND DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT, WHAT THE TURKS CONSIDER THEIR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS. THE TURKS GENERALLY SUPPORT NATO POSITIONS ON MILITARY SUBJECTS, WITH A FEW NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS.

(B) AREA FOR CBM'S -- TURKEY SEEKS EXEMPTION OF SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF TURKISH TERRITORY FROM AREA OF APPLICATION FOR CBMS. THEY ARGUE WITHIN THE NATO CAUCUS THAT ONLY EUROPEAN PORTION OF TURKEY (TURKISH THRACE) IS TECHNICALLY COVERED BY NATO "ALL OF EUROPE" FORMULA, AND THAT ANY OTHER PART OF TURKEY WHICH THEY AGREE TO INCLUDE IS REALLY ONLY A GESTURE OF GOODWILL ON THEIR PART. TURKS HERE HAVE INDICATED THAT THIS POSITION IS STRONGLY HELD BY TURKISH GENERAL STAFF, WHO WOULD LIKE TO EXCLUDE CENTRAL ANATOLIA AND A LARGE PART OF SOUTHWESTERN TURKEY, INCLUDING THE PORTS OF ISKENDERUN AND MERSIN, FROM THE CBM AREA. NEVERTHELESS, THE TURKS WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE THE BLACK SEA AND AEGEAN COASTAL AREAS IF THE SOVIETS ALSO INCLUDE THEIR BLACK SEA COAST. THE NATO CAUCUS HAS POINTED OUT THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO INCLUDE SUCH EXCEPTIONS IN A GENERAL FORMULA FOR AREA OF APPLICATION, AND HAVE NOTED INFORMALLY THAT EXCLUSION OF PORTS NEAR CYPRUS WOULD RAISE SUSPICIONS AS TO THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE TURKS. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, THE TURKS HAVE BEEN ADAMANT. THEIR CONCEPT, IF MADE KNOWN OUTSIDE NATO CAUCUS, WOULD PLAY INTO SOVIET HANDS, SINCE IT WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE SOVIET FORMULA FOR A BORDER ZONE OF 100 KILOMETERS.

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(C) BORDER WITH SYRIA/IRAQ -- THE TURKS HAVE NOTED PRIVATELY THAT THEIR FRONTIER WITH SYRIA/IRAQ POSES SPECIAL MILITARY SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR THEM, SINCE THEY ARE THUS IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO A HIGHLY UNSTABLE AREA. THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT THIS FACT JUSTIFIES SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR TURKISH NEEDS IN THE MILITARY SECURITY FIELD.

(D) AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS -- TURKEY FAVORS A PROVISION FOR NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS, AND INDICATION OF THEIR SPECIAL CONCERN FOR THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND VULNERABILITY OF THE BOSPHORUS/DARDANELLES STRAITS IN TIME OF WAR.

7. ECONOMICS --

(A) EUROPEAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES -- TURKEY HAS

PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN TRYING TO GET CSCE TO ADOPT A TEXT RECOGNIZING THAT THERE ARE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE. THEY PRESSED HARD, AND UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO GET ACTIVE SUPPORT OF NATO CAUCUS ON THIS ISSUE, AND ARE NOW WORKING WITH OTHER EUROPEAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (INCLUDING ROMANIA, GREECE, PORTUGAL, SPAIN AND MALTA) FOR ACCEPTANCE OF A PARAGRAPH IN THE BASKET II PREAMBLE WHICH WOULD RECOGNIZE STATUS OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

(B) MIGRATORY WORKERS -- TURKEY HAS TAKEN A LEADING ROLE (ALONG WITH SPAIN AND YUGOSLAVIA) IN PROPOSING TEXTS WHICH WOULD IMPROVE THE STATUS OF MIGRATORY WORKERS IN EUROPE.

8. BASKET III --

(A) FAMILY REUNIFICATION -- TURKS HAVE PRESSED STRONGLY FOR A PHRASE IN INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE OF HUMAN CONTACTS RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT AGREEMENTS IN THIS AREA ARE INTENDED TO "IMPROVE EXISTING PRACTICES." TURKEY HAS AGREEMENTS WITH BULGARIA ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION WHICH THE TURKS FEEL ARE BETTER THAN CSCE TEXTS, AND THEY DO NOT WISH TO SEE THEIR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ERODED.

9. MEDITERRANEAN -- ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NEVER WISHED TO RAISE MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES IN CSCE (THEY CONSIDER SECRET

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THEM A COMPLICATING FACTOR), THE TURKS HAVE FELT OBLIGED TO SUPPORT MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVES WHEN PROPOSED, BECAUSE OF THEIR STATUS AS A MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRY. THUS PARTICIPATE IN THE INFORMAL MEDITERRANEAN CAUCUS, WHICH HAS HELD GROUP CONSULTATIONS WITH MEDITERRANEAN ARAB STATES REGARDING THE ROLE OF NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES IN CSCE. AS A MOSLEM COUNTRY, TURKEY HAS FELT AN OBLIGATION TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THE NON-PARTICIPATING ARAB MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, AND THUS SPONSORED A CONTRIBUTION BY EGYPT. THEY HAVE TRIED TO PLAY A LOW-KEY CONCILIATORY ROLE ON THESE SUBJECTS, AND HAVE PAID CLOSE ATTENTION TO US VIEWS AT ALL TIMES.

10. FOLLOW-UP -- THE TURKS ARE PRIVATELY HOSTILE TO ANY NOTION OF FOLLOW-UP, EVEN THE DANISH (EC-NINE) PROPOSAL FOR A PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOLLOWED BY A MEETING OF HIGH OFFICIALS.

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